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Abstract In this paper we empirically investigate how to
appropriately model utility of wealth and health. We use a
recently proposed alternative approach to value willingness
to pay (WTP) for health, making use of trade-offs between
income and life years or quality of life, which we extend to
allow for a more realistic multiplicative utility function
over health and money. Moreover, we show how reference-
dependency can be incorporated into this model and derive
its predictions for WTP elicitation. We propose three
experimental elicitation procedures and test these in a
feasibility study, analysing the responses under different
assumptions about the discount rate. Several interesting
results are reported: first, the data are highly skewed, but if
we trim the 5% lowest and highest values, we obtain
plausible WTP estimates. Second, the results differ con-
siderably between procedures, indicating that WTP esti-
mates are sensitive to the assumed utility function. Third,
respondents appear to be loss averse for both health and
money, which is consistent with assumptions from prospect
theory. Finally, our results also indicate that respondents
are more willing to trade quality of life than life years.
Keywords Loss aversion  Time trade-off method 
QALY  Utility of health and wealth  Willingness to pay
JEL Classification B41  D03  I10
Introduction
Economic evaluations provide information on costs and
effects of health technologies. Within economic evalua-
tions, health effects are typically expressed in quality
adjusted life years (QALYs). The QALY is a uniform
outcome measure of health benefit that combines length of
life with quality of life (QoL). By expressing health out-
comes with a uniform measure, outcomes can be compared
across different diseases and treatments, which can be
helpful for decision makers in the process of making
reimbursement decisions.
While operating under budgetary constraints and pres-
sure, advisory bodies, such as the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence [1] in England and the
National Health Care Institute [2] in the Netherlands, are
searching for the shadow price of a QALY [3]. However,
these two bodies use different shadow prices: NICE claims
to base its shadow price upon forgone health [4], whereas
the Dutch National Health Care Institute bases it upon the
consumption value of health [2].
In the first case, the value of health is determined by
comparing the expected health gains of a health interven-
tion to the health that is likely forgone elsewhere due to the
displacement of activities within a fixed budget (i.e. if a
new therapy is reimbursed, the costs need to come from
somewhere else within the health care budget). This
approach is also labelled as adopting a health care per-
spective, focussing only (or primarily) on costs to the
health care sector and the health effects of an intervention.
Cost-effectiveness analyses may suffice to prioritize
healthcare in this case, operating under an exogenous
budget constraint that is imposed by a higher authority
[4, 5]. In general, the decision rule then indicates that only
when the health gained exceeds the health displaced
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(abstracting from possible equity considerations), a new
intervention should be adopted. Within this framework, it
is not possible to judge whether the budget itself has been
set appropriately.
In the second case, the value of health is determined by
assessing the amount of consumption that individuals are
willing to give up to improve health [4]. This approach relates
to adopting a societal perspective in performing economic
evaluations, taking into account the broader societal costs and
benefits of health interventions. Countries considering using
this decision framework require a monetary estimate of the
(consumption) value of health. The decision rule then
becomes that the monetary value of the health produced
(welfare gained) should exceed the monetary value of the
costs (welfare sacrificed). As long as this rule is followed in
adopting and applying technologies, the appropriate budget
follows from these decisions. In this paper we focus on the
estimation of the consumption value of health and, hence, we
seek to estimate the monetary value of a QALY.
Two kinds of willingness to pay (WTP) approaches have
frequently been used to estimate the monetary value of a
QALY. The first approach has been to elicit the WTP for a
reduction in the risk of death and then calculate the value
of a life, from which the monetary value of a QALY can be
inferred [6–9]. The second approach has been to elicit the
WTP for changes in health status directly [10–21].
FewWTP studies have investigated the role of reference-
dependency, which has often been demonstrated to play a
considerable role in people’s decisions and valuations
[22–25]. Reference-dependency is part of prospect theory
and implies that individuals consider a reference point and
frame outcomes as gains and losses relative to this reference
point [26]. Furthermore, losses are often given more weight
than gains of similar size, a phenomenon which has been
termed loss aversion [27]. If reference-dependency is not
taken into account, the valuation of health obtained from a
WTP study may be affected considerably by the particular
framing used and is potentially distorted by loss aversion.
For example, in a recent paper, Holte et al. [28] tested ref-
erence-dependency in WTP among physicians using both a
contingent valuation and a Discrete Choice Experiment
(DCE), and found that they value losses from their current
income 3 times higher than equivalent gains.
Tilling et al. [29] suggested an alternative approach to
estimate the monetary value of a QALY, based upon a time
trade-off (TTO) exercise. In this method, people are asked
to choose between living longer (in some fixed health state)
with less income and living shorter (in that same health
state) with more income. Thus, a trade-off is made between
length of life (in a particular health state) and income,
which allows investigation of the implicit monetary value
given to QALYs. Tilling et al. [29] estimated WTP
assuming an additive lifetime utility function, which may
be too restrictive [30–35]. Therefore, in this paper we
investigate empirically how to model health and wealth
more appropriately. To this end, we assembled data in a
representative sample of the Dutch population, using a
multiplicative utility function in the computation of WTP
and allowing for reference-dependence and loss aversion.
In addition, besides longevity we also include a variation in
QoL in order to explore whether these different response
scales generate the same willingness to pay for a QALY.
Finally, we compare performance of different specifica-
tions of the utility function, with and without discounting.
In what follows, we present our model and extend it to
include reference-dependency. ‘‘Experiment’’ gives details
of the experiment and ‘‘Results’’ present its results. Finally,
‘‘Discussion’’ ends the paper with a discussion of the results.
Methods
In the previous ‘TTO for income-study’ [29], an additive
function W(.) over healthy life years (H) and income (Y)
was assumed:
W H; Yð Þ ¼ U Hð Þ þ Y : ð1Þ
That is, individuals derive value from their lifetime and have
a linear utility function over income. This specification was
used earlier by Eeckhoudt et al. [36].1 The advantage of this
function is that it becomes straightforward to elicit a monetary
value from the utility of perfect health. The pitfall is that it is
descriptively less accurate. In particular, assuming this utility
function implies independence of consumption utility from the
level of health, which was one of the ‘impossibility theorem
criteria’ set out by Dolan and Edlin [38]. Moreover, the
empirical literature tends to reject this assumption in favour of a
multiplicative utility function over health and income. Indeed,
there is evidence that marginal utility of wealth increases with
health and longevity, which is impossible under an additive
function [30–33, 35].2 We therefore study the following utility
function over health and income:
W H; Yð Þ ¼ D tð Þ  Q VðYÞ; ð2Þ
with D tð Þ ¼PTt¼1 dðtÞ representing the sum of the discount
factors dðtÞ for each period t until the final period under
consideration T,3 and Q the QoL experienced during all
1 Eeckhoudt et al. [37] also used an additive function, although they
took a linear function over health and a concave function over wealth.
2 Tengstam [39] instead found evidence that marginal utility of
income decreases with health.
3 Discounting influences the results, even when health and income
are discounted at the same rate, because years given up necessarily
occur at the end of the timeframe, whereas one can immediately start
enjoying the higher income. Hence, years given up are more heavily
influenced by discounting.
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periods between t = 1 and t = T (i.e. a chronic health
state). We take Q to be on the usual cardinal scale with 0
indicating a health state as bad as being dead and 1 indi-
cating full health. Bleichrodt and Quiggin [40] have given
the axiomatic foundations for this function. The simplest
configuration would be to take both D(t) and V(Y) to be
linear (i.e. dðtÞ = 1 for all t and V(Y) = Y), but this lacks
realism. It is more likely that marginal utility decreases
with income, i.e. V"(Y)\ 0. Here, we model this by con-
sidering a power utility function V Yð Þ ¼ Ya, with a as a
measure of the utility curvature of income and V Yð Þ ¼
lnðYÞ for a = 0 [41]. Decreasing (constant, increasing)
marginal utility of income is reflected in this function by
a\ 1 [=1,[1]. Therefore, our lifetime utility function will
take the form:
W H; Yð Þ ¼ DðtÞ  Q Ya: ð3Þ
Empirical support for this function was provided by
Levy and Nir [42], who used a special case of this function
where V(Y) = ln (aY) (i.e. a = 0 in Eq. 3 and a scaling
parameter a). In the following sections, we present the
predictions stemming from the multiplicative model. In
addition, the predictions according to the additive model
are given in ‘‘Appendix A’’.
Income levels
Before the experiment started, subjects were, among other
things, asked for: their current net household income
(called C hereafter), the net income that would be sufficient
to just make ends meet while staying in their current house
(subsistence income, called S hereafter), and the net
income they would need to be able to live a comfort-
able life without any worries (luxury income, called L
hereafter).4
The TTO for income approach
In TTO1, respondents were asked to choose to live T = 10
more years in their current health state Q (as measured by a
visual analogue scale at the beginning of the experiment)
and their current salary C or to live an amount X1
B 10 years in their current health state Q but with their
higher luxury income L.
Suppose you can choose between the following two
options:
Option A
‘‘You live for 10 years in your current health state with a
net monthly income of [C/12], without any changes to it.
Then you die.’’
Option B
‘‘You live for X yearsin your current health state with a
net monthly income of [L/12], without any changes to it.
Then you die.’’
TTO1: Trading life years to achieve an income gain
in current health
Hence, TTO1 elicited the number of life years X1 such that
the subject would be indifferent between (10 years, C) and
(X1 years, L). Under the multiplicative model (Eq. 3), this
would result in the following equality:
Dð10Þ  Q Ca ¼ DðX1Þ  Q La: ð4Þ
From this, we can compute an estimate of a:
a ¼ ln Dð10Þð Þ  lnðDðX1ÞÞ
ln Lð Þ  lnðCÞ ð5Þ
with a[ 0. Having this estimate, we can continue to infer
an estimate of the WTP for 1 year in full health
[WTP(YFH)]. For example, we can estimate the income Y
such that, given the estimate of a from Eq. 5, living 9 years
with this income would give equal (remaining) lifetime
utility as the initial scenario with 10 years and income C:
Dð10Þ  Ca ¼ Dð9Þ  Ya , Y ¼ Dð10Þ
Dð9Þ
 1=a
C: ð6Þ
WTP for a healthy life year is then given by the addi-
tional lifetime income people demand in return for reduc-
ing life by 1 year, corrected for their QoL:
WTP YFHð Þ ¼ Dð9ÞY  Dð10ÞCð Þ
Q
¼
Dð9Þ Dð10Þ
Dð9Þ
 1=a
Dð10Þ
 
C
Q
: ð7Þ
Equation A2 in Appendix A gives the expression for
WTP under the additive model with X = X1.
In TTO2, respondents were asked to choose to live
T = 10 more years in their current health state Q and with
a lower salary S, or to live an amount X2 B 10 years in
their current health state Q but with current income C.
Suppose you can choose between the following two
options:
Option A
‘‘You live for 10 years in your current health state with a
net monthly income of [S/12], without any changes to it.
Then you die.’’
4 Incomes were expressed in monthly terms in the questionnaire,
because most people are used getting their income once a month.
However, for the analysis we transformed monthly incomes into
yearly incomes, since we estimate willingness to pay for healthy life
years. Hence, we refer to C, L and S as yearly amounts throughout this
paper.
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Option B
‘‘You live for X years in your current health state with a
net monthly income of [C/12], without any changes to it.
Then you die.’’
TTO2: Trading life years to achieve an income gain
in current health
TTO2 gives the estimates of a and WTP for the multi-
plicative [additive] model as provided in Eqs. 5 and 7,
(A2), with C replaced by S, L replaced by C, and X1 by X2.
A third possibility of eliciting the monetary value of a
QALY is a new variation to the common TTO for income
procedure: the quality trade-off (QTO). This procedure
varies QoL instead of life duration. Suppose we apply QTO
with T = 10 years in full health and income C, and we ask
for the QoL score X3 with T = 10 years with income
L rendering indifference. Health status is described on a
10-point scale, with 10 representing perfect health and 0 a
health state as bad as being dead. This is comparable to a
visual analogue scale (VAS), which is frequently used for
health status measurements. Parkin and Devlin [43] give
advantages of using the VAS in cost-utility analyses.
QTO: Trading quality to achieve an income gain
during 10 remaining years
Suppose you can choose between the following two
options:
Option A
‘‘You live for 10 years in a perfect health state (10 on a
scale of 0–10) with a net monthly income of [C/12],
without any changes to it. Then you die.’’
Option B
‘‘You live for 10 years in moderate health (X on a scale
of 0–10) with a net monthly income of [L/12], without any
changes to it. Then you die.’’
For the sake of convenience, but without affecting the
results, we transformed X3 to a 0–1 scale by dividing the
answer by 10. Hence, X3 has a range of 0 (death) to 1
(perfect health). If there is no reference-dependency, this
indifference can again be evaluated by Eq. 3, yielding:
Dð10Þ  1 Ca ¼ Dð10Þ  X3  La; ð8Þ
a ¼  ln X3ð Þ
ln Lð Þ  lnðCÞ : ð9Þ
Because according to the QALY model T and Q are
fully exchangeable, meaning that living 10 years with QoL
9 is equivalent to living 9 years with QoL 10, solving Eq. 8
for WTP(YFH) yields the same result as Eq. 7. Therefore,
this model predicts WTP and a to be the same in TTO1 and
QTO. In other words X1 is predicted to be equal to X3.
Accounting for reference-dependent preferences
A large body of evidence has emerged suggesting that
people deviate from several rationality assumptions
underlying neoclassical economic theory. One such devi-
ation is that individuals tend to behave according to pro-
spect theory [25, 26, 44]. In particular, they often form
reference points and handle gains and losses as seen from
this reference point differently. There is evidence that this
behaviour also occurs in health-related decision making
[45–47]. In order to accommodate this possibility, we
analysed our data under this assumption from prospect
theory as well.
Preferences become reference-dependent if we assume
prospect theory, which requires separate formulations for
gains and losses. In particular, we investigated reference-
dependency by the model proposed by Shalev [48], which
for income culminates into:
U Yð Þ ¼ uðYÞ
uðY0 þ kM Y  Y0ð ÞÞ

if Y  Y0
if Y\Y0
; ð10Þ
with kM a loss aversion index for monetary outcomes and
Y0 the status quo. Although the utility function may be
different for gains and losses, e.g. u(Y) = Ya for gains and
u(Y) = -(-Y)b for losses, with a, b[ 0, for simplicity we
assume they are the same. Extending this model to health
yields:
U Hð Þ ¼ uðHÞ
uðH0 þ kH H  H0ð ÞÞ

if HH0
if H\H0
; ð11Þ
with kH a loss aversion index for health outcomes.
In the last part of this section we describe the three
experimental procedures that will be applied in this study
and two hypotheses to be tested based on these procedures.
First, suppose we apply TTO1 again with the same stimuli.
According to prospect theory, respondents then have to
trade off a gain in income against a loss in lifetime. If we
assume {10 years, C} to be the reference point, this
involves comparing the status quo against a mixed pro-
spect, which would be evaluated by:
Dð10Þ  Q Ca ¼ Dð10Þ þ kH DðX1Þ  Dð10Þð Þ½   Q
 La:
ð12Þ
Solving this expression for X1 gives:
X1 ¼ D1 Dð10ÞkH
C
L
 a
þkH  1
  
: ð13Þ
which is increasing in kH . Therefore, X1 will be higher for
people who are loss averse (kH[1) than for people who are
loss neutral (kH = 1). In the classical approach described
in ‘‘Methods’’ loss aversion is ignored, implicitly assuming
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kH = 1. Consequently, the effect of loss aversion will be
picked up by our estimate of a (Eq. 5), which is decreasing
in X1 and, hence, will be lower if people are loss averse
than if they are not. As derived in ‘‘Appendix B’’, the real
estimate of a is given by:
a ¼ ln D 10ð Þð Þ  ln D 10ð Þ þ kH D X1ð Þ  D 10ð Þð Þð Þ
ln Lð Þ  lnðCÞ ; ð14Þ
which requires knowledge of kH . Therefore, because our
estimated a is decreasing in X1, and X1 increases with kH ,
the classical approach can be expected to generate an
underestimation of the true a in case of loss aversion and,
hence, an overestimation of WTP for a QALY (Eq. 7).
Now let us reconsider TTO2 in case of prospect theory.
If we assume {10 Years, C} is still the reference point, the
first option now entails a loss in income, whereas the
second option still entails a loss in health. In other words,
we are now comparing a loss in the monetary domain to a
loss in the health domain. Indifference between the two
options can then be evaluated by:
Dð10Þ  Q C þ kMðS CÞ½ a
¼ Dð10Þ þ kH DðX2Þ  Dð10Þð Þ½   Q Ca; ð15Þ
which gives a different solution for X2 than we had for X1
in the first procedure (Eq. 13):
X2 ¼ D1 Dð10ÞkH
C þ kMðS CÞ
C
 a
þkH  1
  
; ð16Þ
X2 is increasing in kH again, but at the same time
decreasing in kM . In other words, the two loss aversion
coefficients are opposing forces in determining X2 and the
qualitative effect of loss aversion on X2 will therefore
depend on the relative values of kH and kM . Consequently,
the estimate of a (Eq. 5) is expected to be higher in TTO2
than in TTO1. Since Eq. 5 provides an underestimation of
a in TTO1, the amount of the underestimation would be
reduced in TTO2, and may even change into an overesti-
mation if kH is high enough.
Hypothesis testing
We therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The estimated power coefficient of the
utility function will be lower in TTO1 than in TTO2 (TTO1
vs TTO2): a1\ a2
The hypothesis will be tested within-subjects using a
paired t-test (for means) and a Wilcoxon signed ranks test
(for medians) on a1 and a2. A confirmation of this
hypothesis would be a violation of the multiplicative
function as formulated in Eq. 3 and could be explained by
prospect theory or another parametric shape of the utility
functions, as further explained in the ‘‘Discussion’’ sec-
tion. A rejection of Hypothesis 1 would imply that the
classical theory cannot be falsified.
If prospect theory holds, respondents have to trade off a
gain in income against a loss in QoL. Assuming {10 years
in full health, C} to be the reference point, this again
involves comparing the status quo against a mixed pro-
spect, which under the multiplicative model would be
represented by:
Dð10Þ  1 Ca ¼ Dð10Þ  1 1þ kQðX3  1Þ½   La:
ð17Þ
This expression can be solved for X3:
X3 ¼ 1kQ
C
L
 a
þkQ  1
 
: ð18Þ
Comparing Eqs. 13 to 18, it becomes evident that X1
and X3 are expected to differ only to the extent that loss
aversion for QoL differs from loss aversion for life dura-
tion, and to the extent that people discount the future.
It is important to obtain information about the amount of
loss aversion in both life duration and QoL, since many
preference elicitation tasks, such as TTO, standard gamble
or WTP involve the reduction of one or both of these
outcomes. There is very limited evidence on the amount of
loss aversion for life duration and QoL, though [45, 49].
Consequently, based on the current literature, we cannot
make a confident prediction as to whether loss aversion is
stronger for life duration or for QoL. Intuitively, people
may be more reluctant to give up lifetime, which would
translate into more loss aversion for life duration than for
QoL, but no firm evidence is available on this point.
Consequently, our second hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 2 There is no difference in the loss aversion
coefficient for life duration and quality of life (TTO1 vs
QTO): kH = kQ:
A confirmation of this hypothesis implies that agents are
equally loss averse for these two outcomes, whereas a
rejection would suggest they are not. We will test this
hypothesis by comparing X1 and X3 using a paired t-test
and a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. X1 and X3 are predicted
to be equal if kH = kQ; as derived earlier.
Experiment
Subjects
A total of 550 subjects, representative for the Dutch adult
population in terms of gender, age and level of education,
participated in the experiment. The study presented here
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was part of a larger experiment conducted in 2013 that
included data collection for two other (unrelated, yet
unpublished) studies investigating positional concerns in
health.
Procedure
The procedure to arrive at an estimate of X consisted of (a
maximum of) three steps. In the first choice between
options A and B, X was always equal to 10 years (life
duration part) or 10 QoL points (QoL part). Because
monotonicity implies dominance of option B in this situ-
ation, we would expect respondents to opt for B here. In
case one chose A, we asked whether they really preferred
10 years with lower income C to 10 years with higher
income L. If so, these respondents were viewed as people
who ‘‘are not willing to play the game’’ and a missing value
was saved for X. Otherwise, they received the original
question anew. If respondents were indifferent, a value of
10 was saved for X. If B was chosen, X was randomly
lowered to 3, 5, or 7 years/QoL points. The respondent
could then choose A or B again or express indifference. In
case of indifference, the provided value of X was the eli-
cited indifference point. If A or B was chosen, the
respondent had to indicate the value of X such that A and B
were equally attractive to them by using a scroll bar, where
the range of the scroll bar was censored by the previous
choice. For example, if the respondent received X = 3 in
the second choice and then opted for A, the scroll bar was
censored between 3 and 10, whereas it was between 0 and 3
if they opted for B. The order of the WTP questions was
the same for all respondents: TTO1 was elicited first, fol-
lowed by TTO2 and QTO.
The experiment was conducted by a professional inter-
net sampling company (Survey Sampling International).
This company has much experience with internet surveys
and a large representative database of subjects. The sub-
jects were rewarded with a small monetary amount to be
given to a charity fund of their choice, upon completion of
the questionnaire.
Current, subsistence and luxury income were measured
on a categorical scale (with ‘‘999 € or less’’ as the lowest
category, ‘‘8000 € or more’’ as the highest category, and
eleven 500-€ intervals in between). We used the midpoint
of the chosen scale as the amount (i.e. C, S or L) to be used
in TTO questions. Whenever someone expressed subsis-
tence income to be above current income (38.9%), or
luxury income below current income (10%), we replaced
these values in the TTO questions in order to enable sen-
sible trade-offs. In particular, S was replaced by half of
current income and L was replaced by twice the amount of
current income.
It was possible not to trade off any life years or quality
of life. In the remainder of this paper, a respondent who
behaves in this fashion in a task is termed a non-trader in
that particular question. Furthermore, it was also possible
to trade so many years/quality of life that the resulting
WTP was negative. If such a result occurs, we speak of
over-trading in the particular task.
Analysis
As pointed out by Gyrd-Hansen and Kjær [50], there tends to
be a lot of heterogeneity in WTP for QALY estimates. They
demonstrate that, because of this heterogeneity, the choice of
the analytical approach can make for a large difference in
WTP estimates. They compared the aggregated or ‘ratio of
means’ approach (i.e. sum of the individual WTP estimates
divided by the sum of the considered QALY gains) with the
disaggregated or ‘mean of ratios’ approach (i.e. the mean of
ratios of the WTP and the associated QALY gain for each
individual separately), and observed large differences in the
results. One of the reasons was that in the disaggregated
approach it was not possible to include non-traders, because
their QALY gain was zero. Our data contains a lot of non-
traders: 247 (44.9%), 180 (32.7%) and 148 (26.9%) for
TTO1, TTO2 andQTO, respectively (see Table 1). Indeed, a
disadvantage of the current method is that, if we would use
the disaggregated approach, we do not obtain information
about the monetary value of health for a significant fraction
of the respondents. In this study we therefore use the
aggregated approach. This approach allows the inclusion of
the valuations of the non-traders. However, the results from
the disaggregated approach are shown in ‘‘Appendix C’’.
Table 1 Overview of WTP
classifications
WTP1 (L-C) WTP2 (C-S) WTP3 (L-C QoL)
A Non-traders 247 (44.9%) 180 (32.7%) 148 (26.9%)
B Over-traders; negative WTP 77 (14%) 111 (20.2%) 0 (add); 151 (27.5%)
C Over-traders; trading off all years/quality 1 (0.2%) 8 (1.5%) 2 (0.4%)
D Zero WTP 12 (2.2%) 59 (10.7%) 0
E S = 0a 0 2 (0.4%) 0
F Net sample size aggregated approach 550 550 550
a Excluded from analysis
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The analyses were performed assuming two different
scenarios: zero discounting and a conventional 3% annual
discount rate. The main findings were not sensitive to the
choice of the discount rate. Both analyses are reported
below.
Our design allowed for a crude test of sensitivity to
scope, both at the inter-respondent and the intra-respondent
level. Regarding the former, we could test whether
respondents with a higher difference between C and L also
gave up more life years and quality of life. This was per-
formed by Kendall’s s test on the correlation between L–
C [C–S] and 10 - X1 and 10 - X3 [10 - X2] (i.e. the
number of years/QoL points traded). At the intra-respon-
dent level, any difference between the increase from S to
C and the increase from C to L could similarly be used to
test for sensitivity to scope. We accomplished this by
computing the ratio of (L–C) - (C–S) = L ? S-2C to (X1–
X2). This ratio should be positive if respondents are sen-
sitive to scope. However, it should be noted that, contrary
to an ideal test of sensitivity to scope, the starting levels are
different. Hence, it may be that respondents are sensitive to
the amount of income to be gained, but still do not trade
more life years for a higher income gain if the starting level
is much higher (i.e. C vs S), because of diminishing mar-
ginal utility of income.
Our dataset enabled a straightforward, although admit-
tedly restricted, performance test of different utility func-
tions. This was accomplished by computing the squares of
the individual differences between WTP1 and WTP2 for
several model specifications (i.e. the additive model and
the multiplicative model both with power and exponential
utility for income, with and without reference-dependence,
and with and without 3% discounting) and testing for dif-
ferences in this squared error between models (Wilcoxon
signed ranks tests).5
Results
Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix D present some demographic
variables of our sample, as well as descriptive statistics of
X1, X2 and X3. The numbers indicate representativeness for
the Dutch adult population according to age, gender and
education.
The mean current net household income (C/12) of the
respondents was 2152.27 € per month (range 500 €–
8500 €, SD 1310.29 €). Furthermore, their reported mean
monthly subsistence income level (S/12) was 2080.42 €
(range 0 €–20,000 €; SD 1204.67 €), and the mean
monthly luxury income level (L/12) was 3706.51 € (range
0 €–203,039 €; SD 9685.95 €). The percentage of
respondents stating S B C was 61.1%, whereas 90.0%
reported L C C. Figure 1 shows the distributions of the
Fig. 1 Distributions of income changes received by the respondents
5 The exponential model performed worse than the power model and
is not presented in the paper. The results of this model are available
from the authors upon request. For loss aversion, we implemented a
loss aversion coefficient of 1.18 for both health and money, which
was the median loss aversion index for life years reported by Attema
et al. [45].
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income improvements respondents faced in the experiment.
This shows there is a lot of heterogeneity.
Table 1 classifies the respondents in different groups:
non-traders, over-traders (i.e. causing a negative WTP) and
respondents with zero WTP; a high number of non-traders
appeared in all three tasks.
Table 2 gives the estimates obtained under the multi-
plicative model. This table shows a similar pattern across
methods. The outliers are less influential in the aggregated
approach than in the disaggregated approach (see Appen-
dix C, Table 6), giving much more conservative estimates.
In order to remove the inflating effect of the outliers, we
also analysed the data using a trimmed dataset, where we
removed the 5% highest and 5% lowest WTP ratios.
The formal tests of our hypotheses give the following
results.
Hypothesis 1. We observe (see Table 2) a1 to be lower
than a2 (p\ 0.01), which is consistent with our prediction
resulting from loss aversion. Related to this finding, the
median WTP is higher for TTO1 than for TTO2 (p\ 0.01),
indicating individuals are willing to give up more lifetime
to move from a subsistence income to their current refer-
ence level income, than to move from their current refer-
ence level income to a luxury income.
Hypothesis 2. X1 is higher than X3 (Table D2, p\ 0.01),
indicating that loss aversion is stronger for life duration
than for QoL.
Sub-group analyses
We also performed several sub-group analyses. In partic-
ular, we tested whether there were differences in the pro-
portions of non-traders and over-traders according to
gender, age, and educational background. There were no
differences between men and women (v2 test, p[ 0.67).
For education, a v2 test showed no effect of education for
TTO1 (p = 0.17) and QTO (p = 0.055), but it did for
TTO2 (p\ 0.01). Specifically, more highly educated
people had a greater tendency to be non-traders and a lower
tendency to be over-traders. Correlations between age and
WTP were not significant for TTO1 and TTO2 (Kendall’s s
test, p[ 0.25), but there was a significant negative corre-
lation between age and WTP for QTO (Kendall’s s test,
p\ 0.05). Finally, we tested the effects of the above socio-
demographic characteristics simultaneously by conducting
logistic regressions on the various WTP measures. The
results are presented in Table 3 and indicate a similar
pattern.
Sensitivity to scope
Our results on sensitivity to scope are mixed. Between-
respondents, we observe a positive correlation between L– T
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C and the number of years traded (10-X1) (Kendall’s s test;
p\ 0.05), but no significant correlations for the other
question (X2, p = 0.72). Within-respondents, 167 [179,
170] have a positive [negative, zero] ratio of L ? S-2C to
(X1-X2).
6 Therefore, there is not much evidence for sensi-
tivity to scope within-subjects. However, as noted before,
this is no evidence of absence of the scope effect per se,
because of the varying starting levels. We should also bear
in mind that these results partly follow from the main test
results: if there were perfect scope effects, WTP would be
the same for all questions, and we observed in the previous
part of this section that it is not.
Performance test
The multiplicative model with power utility for income,
loss aversion, and a 3% discount rate had a lower squared
error than the other specifications (p\ 0.01 for all com-
parisons). Of course, a more accurate test would have loss
aversion coefficients and discount functions elicited at the
individual level, but still our results suggest that models
with state- and reference- dependent models perform better
than additive and non-reference-dependent models, and
that discounting of future outcomes should be taken into
account in WTP estimations.
Discussion
This research set out to explore a novel method of valuing
life years by means of trading life years for income. We
applied three different procedures to elicit WTP with this
method, under different assumptions about the utility
functions for health and money. Moreover, we extended
the model to incorporate reference-dependency and derived
its prediction for each of these procedures.
Our trimmed WTP estimates give numbers that are
comparable to estimates found in the literature
[6, 13, 21, 51], although the high variation across proce-
dures indicates a high susceptibility to the particular pro-
cedure employed. Likewise, the differences between
models show the large influence of the particular assump-
tions about the utility functions for life duration and con-
sumption on WTP estimates. Regarding the former, we find
a difference in WTP between two procedures in the
direction predicted by prospect theory. This result is con-
firmed by a test showing that a multiplicative, reference-
dependent model with discounting has the highest predic-
tive power. Furthermore, we observe less non-trading when
using QoL instead of life duration as response scale,
although this does not necessarily translate into higher
WTP for a healthy life year.
One of the limitations of this study was the high number
of non-traders. Non-willingness to trade may be a sincere
preference or an expression of protest against the nature of
the exercise, but part of it may also be the result of the
magnitude of our trade unit. The minimum amount to be
traded was 0.1 years, which is approximately 5 weeks. So,
if people were only prepared to sacrifice, say, 2 weeks, 0
was closer to this amount than 0.1 years. These respon-
dents would then appear to have an infinite WTP, whereas
in reality their WTP is finite (albeit high).
Although many respondents did not trade at all, only
about 25% of these non-traders expressed indifference
between 10 years with the lower income and 10 years with
the higher income, which would be the implication of non-
trading. The other 75% preferred 10 years with the higher
income, but picked the highest possible answer in the slider
(i.e. 10 years with the higher income). Hence, it seems that
these respondents had some other reason to refuse any
trading than being indifferent between earning a lower or a
higher income. Explanations may be that they attempted to
‘improve their position’ or because their indifference value
was between 9.9 and 10 years, which could not be
expressed in our questionnaire (see above). Future research
Table 3 Logistic regressions
TTO1 TTO2 QTO
WTP1 negative WTP1 infinite WTP2 negative WTP2 infinite WTP3 negative WTP3 infinite
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Constant -1.39* 0.61 -1.17** 0.44 -1.53** 0.54 -1.57** 0.47 -0.45 0.48 -2.58** 0.51
Age 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.007 0.02** 0.01
Female -0.11 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.18 -0.11 0.19 0.17 0.20
Medium education -0.25 0.29 0.41 0.22 -0.08 0.10 0.51* 0.24 -0.47* 0.23 0.58* 0.25
High education -0.54 0.33 0.61** 0.23 -0.26 0.29 0.99** 0.25 -0.62* 0.25 0.74** 0.27
* Significant at the 5%-level
** Significant at the 1%-level
6 For the remaining 34 respondents, a ratio could not be computed
because their denominator (L ? S-2C) equalled 0.
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may therefore experiment with other designs such as only
presenting binary choices or not applying sliders. More-
over, such research may more directly address the moti-
vation of respondents for certain response patterns. Finally,
more personalized information could be given to respon-
dents, accompanied by a feedback module, in order to
reduce misunderstandings of the choice task.
The difference in non-trading behaviour between TTO1
and TTO2 may also have been caused by the size of the
difference between current and luxury income, versus the
difference between subsistence and current income, which
of course differed between subjects. The former difference
was higher on average than the latter. Consequently,
respondents were more likely to give up lifetime in the
current-luxury trade-off than in the subsistence-current
trade-off.
A second limitation was that a substantial part of the
respondents traded too many life years, leading to a neg-
ative WTP for a life year. This finding may be caused by
respondents not seriously engaging in the task, or diffi-
culties with comprehending the task (despite our explana-
tion of the fact that their answer implies their total income
will be lower and their life span shorter), the latter being
underlined by a lower proportion of over-trading among
higher educated respondents. However, it may also be the
result of a true preference for a high income per period.
Obviously, a negative WTP is nonsensical, as it implies
these people would not want to live an additional year in
full health, even if it would cost them no money at all.
However, a possible rationalization for this behaviour
might be that individuals derive such a high amount of
utility from having a high(er) income per month that they
prefer a short life with a high monthly income over a longer
life with more total income but a lower monthly income.
This argument would translate into a composite utility
function that incorporates utility of income instead of
utility of wealth. Finally, the over-trading may be caused
by a high amount of discounting. In our analysis we only
considered discount rates of 0 and 3%, but if in reality
respondents give less weight to their future life years,7 this
may have erroneously caused a negative WTP in our study.
This underlines the necessity to elicit discounting future
health alongside a measurement of WTP in future work.
Hence, more research is required to sort out these
questions.
Third, our results reveal that respondents tend to pick
the highest amount of the range in the scroll bar question,
resulting in a multi-peaked answer distribution. This
observation points toward some kind of preference con-
struction, where respondents are influenced by the initial
question. That is, they may be subject to an anchoring bias,
as reported earlier in TTO and WTP studies [25, 52, 53].
Furthermore, their indifference value may not necessarily
represent a true indifference, but instead a wish of subjects
to improve their position [54]. Such an erroneous percep-
tion of the task as a bargaining task would imply an
underestimation of the amount of lifetime respondents are
willing to trade off, and, hence, and overestimation of
WTP. Because this kind of behaviour could be foreseeable
according to previous research on TTO [55], we imple-
mented three different stimuli in the second choice of each
task (i.e. 3, 5 and 7 years/QoL points, cf. ‘‘Experiment’’).
Fourth, the TTO2 and QTO versions generated signifi-
cantly fewer respondents who were indifferent between
10 years with income L [C] and 10 years with income
C [S], or who even preferred the latter to the former option,
than the TTO1 version. Given that TTO2 and QTO were
always asked after TTO1, this finding could be due to a
learning effect. Future research randomizing the order of
these tasks is needed to test this possibility.
Another criticism may be that the changes in income
that respondents faced could be view as non-marginal,
which is not fully in accordance with the theoretical
underpinnings of WTP for a QALY or the value of a
statistical life. However, using smaller income changes
would have evoked even more non-trading than already
found in this study. Moreover, there was a lot of
heterogeneity around the income increases. The difficult
trade-off between non-trading and non-marginal changes
in the stimuli could be considered a weakness of the
studied method. Future studies are called for to test the
robustness of this method to smaller income changes.
Such a study should arguably also use a more refined
response scale, e.g. expressed in days, hours or even
minutes, in order to be sensitive to such small income
changes. We also advocate future research to perform a
head-to-head comparison of the presented method with
the classical WTP method to directly compare their
estimates.
Like in common TTO exercises, our method comprises
of a trade-off between two certain options. The traditional
TTO method involves a number of assumptions and limi-
tations [56–58]. The key assumptions are constant pro-
portional trade-offs, risk neutrality with respect to life
years, and mutual utility independence [59]. Our findings
indicate that QoL and income are closer substitutes than
longevity and income. This may be caused by people being
reluctant to give up longevity in general, especially when
life expectation is not very long. For example, several TTO
studies have found respondents to violate constant pro-
portional trade-offs because they were willing to give up
relatively more life years for longer life expectancies than
for shorter ones [60–62]. In addition, Pinto-Prades et al.
7 This may also occur in a non-exponential fashion, such as
according to a hyperbolic discounting function.
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[63] reported that people gave more weight to QoL than to
longevity in valuing end-of-life QALYs. These findings
raise serious questions, since they imply, for instance, that
the standard TTO method is not valid. More research is
required to investigate this violation in more detail.
Finally, although we allowed for discounting in our
analysis, we had to assume all subjects discounted at the
same, constant rate. Ideally, in order to capture hetero-
geneity in discounting behaviour, future research should
separately measure discounting at the individual level,
perhaps also allowing for the possibility of non-constant
discounting. However, this comes at the expense of higher
response burden and we suspect it will not affect the
within-subject WTP comparisons.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, several conclu-
sions and areas for future research emerge from our
experiment. First, WTP is sensitive to both the amount of
the income compared and to the currency used to trade off
health for money (i.e. life years or QoL). Second, large
differences in WTP result from making different assump-
tions regarding the lifetime utility function, stressing the
need to obtain a valid measurement of the parametric shape
of this function. Third, the high numbers of infinite and
negative WTP estimates indicate that the procedure used in
this study has drawbacks (like common WTP approaches).
The presence of non-traders is inherent to the WTP and
TTO approaches in general and hard to resolve. The
presence of over-traders is specific to the current method.
Our findings were consistent with Hypothesis 1 (i.e.
a1\ a2), but loss aversion need not be the only reason for
this. One other possibility would be that the multiplicative
model is valid but that it needs to be accompanied by a
nonlinear utility function over life years [64–67]. For
instance, if individuals discount the future, this reflects a
concave utility of life duration function (e.g. a power
function with power smaller than 1). The power estimates
of the utility function over income may turn out to be
constant across questions if we allow for such a generali-
sation, indicating our rejection is due to an invalid
assumption regarding the utility of life duration. This
emphasizes the importance of controlling for both utility
functions. In addition, the multiplicative model may be
valid with a linear utility of life duration, but with the
utility function for income having another parametric shape
than one belonging to the power family. Its shape may
instead be exponential, reflecting constant absolute risk
aversion instead of constant relative risk aversion. How-
ever, applying an exponential function is more elaborative
as it does not give an analytical solution for the exponent
and has to be solved numerically for each respondent. In
sum, our findings neither necessarily reject the multi-
plicative or additive shapes of the utility of health and
wealth, nor do they necessarily imply the presence of loss
aversion; they only indicate that it is inappropriate to
model the responses by a combination of a linear utility of
life duration function, a power function of wealth, and the
assumption of no loss aversion. Further research is required
to test which parametric shape best fits lifetime preferences
and whether assuming prospect theory causes an
improvement in the descriptive validity of individual
behaviour.
The significant difference between X1, the answer to
TTO1, and X3, the answer to QTO, rejects Hypothesis 2
(i.e. kH = kQ), and implies a violation of the QALY model.
The sign of the difference implies more loss aversion with
respect to life duration than with respect to QoL. This
finding is consistent with the tendency of people to refuse
trading off life years in classical TTO [68]. However, WTP
is only higher for TTO1 than QTO under the additive
model; in fact, WTP is lower for TTO1 than for QTO when
assuming the multiplicative model. The major reason for
these contradictory findings seems to be the large number
of respondents with negative WTP: for QTO, negative
WTP was possible under the multiplicative model, but not
under the additive model, resulting in much lower median
WTP estimates under the multiplicative model for this
procedure. This highlights the importance of the underlying
lifetime utility function.
This research clearly has an explorative character. Much
work is still needed on the shadow price of a QALY and on
the TTO method in general; and clearly also in relation to
the potential of the TTO for the income method. Never-
theless, given the existing methodological problems with
traditional WTP, alternative approaches should be devel-
oped and explored. Furthermore, as described earlier in this
discussion, our results open up several new and important
areas for future research.
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Appendix A: derivations of predictions additive
model
Under the additive utility function (Eq. 1), the case where
living X years with the higher income L would give equal
lifetime utility as the initial scenario with 10 years and
income C, both in full health (i.e. Q = 1), will be evaluated
by:
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Dð10Þ  QWTP YFHð Þ þ Dð10Þ  C
¼ DðXÞ  QWTPðYFHÞ þ DðXÞ  L: ðA1Þ
Solving Eq. A1 for WTP(YFH) yields:
WTP YFHð Þ ¼ D Xð Þ  L D 10ð Þ  C
D 10ð Þ  D Xð Þ½   Q : ðA2Þ
In TTO1, reference-dependence gives the following
evaluation:
Dð10Þ  QWTPðYFHÞ þ Dð10Þ  C
¼ D 10ð Þ þ kH DðX1Þ  Dð10Þð Þ½   QWTPðYFHÞ
þ DðX1Þ  L:
ðA3Þ
Solving for X1 gives:
X1 ¼ D1 Dð10Þ  kH  QWTP YFHð Þ þ C½ kH  QWTP YFHð Þ þ L
 
;
ðA4Þ
which is again increasing in kH . Because WTP is increas-
ing in X1, we predict an overestimation of WTP for a
QALY in case of loss aversion.
In TTO2, we obtain the expression below for X2:
X2 ¼ D1 Dð10Þ  kM  ðS CÞkH  QWTP YFHð Þ þ C þ 1
 
: ðA5Þ
This function is increasing in kH and decreasing in kM ,
yielding the same predictions as for the multiplicative
model.
Finally, for QTO, reference-dependence gives:
Dð10Þ  1WTPðYFHÞ þ Dð10Þ  C
¼ Dð10Þ  1þ kQ X3  1ð Þ½  WTPðYFHÞ þ Dð10Þ  L:
ðA6Þ
Solving Eq. A6 for X3 gives:
X3 ¼ 1 L C
WTP YFHð Þð ÞkQ ; ðA7Þ
which is again increasing in kQ:
Table 4 presents the WTP estimates under the assump-
tion of the additive model. The observation of Table D2 of
more life years given up to move from a subsistence
income to their current income, than to move from their
current income to a luxury income, clearly translates into a
lower WTP estimate in the former task than the latter. In
addition, the substantial number of over-traders (resulting
in a negative WTP) explains the low median WTP.
Regarding the additive model, the mean number of
traded life years and the WTP estimates in TTO2 are
comparable to those reported by Tilling et al. [29] (their
TTO1), while our WTP estimates are higher in TTO1 (their
TTO2).8 However, it is important to note that the design of
the studies differed in two aspects. One difference is that
the higher and lower income values in this study were
elicited from respondents, whereas these values were given
by the experimenters in Tilling et al. [29]. A second dif-
ference is that we asked respondents to consider living their
remaining lifetime in their current health state, while Til-
ling et al. [29] instructed respondents to assume to spend
the remaining lifetime in full health. Although we cor-
rected for the respondents’ own health by taking their VAS
score into account, this may nevertheless have caused
differences. Moreover, Tilling et al. used a direct matching
procedure, whereas we employed a combination of bisec-
tion and matching. However, these differences hold for
both versions, so it is not evident why we only observe
higher WTP values for the gain version.
Table 4 WTP estimates (in €, 2013) additive model
WTP1
(L–C)
No discounting
WTP1
(L–C)
3% discounting
WTP2
(C–S)
No discounting
WTP2
(C–S)
3% discounting
WTP3
(L–C QoL)
Disaggregated approach
Mean 234,465 278,310 55,641 67,669 132,322
Median 20,563 26,971 3542 5730 42,000
Mean (trimmed data)a 78,629 96,638 13,381 18,206 138,878
Aggregated approach
Mean 116,216 140,470 15,236 20,811 97,820
Median 401,250 470,965 5000 8521 62,069
Mean (trimmed data)a 86,517 99,153 17,834 21,737 71,493
a 5% upper and lower values
8 Because they only estimated the additive model, our comparisons
only concern that model.
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Appendix B: mathematical derivations
Estimation of a in TTO1 in case of loss aversion:
Dð10ÞQCa ¼ Dð10Þþ kHðDðX1ÞDð10ÞÞ½ QLa
, L
C
 a
¼ D 10ð Þ
D 10ð Þþ kH D X1ð ÞD 10ð Þð Þ
, a ln Lð Þ ln Cð Þð Þ
¼ ln D 10ð Þð Þ ln D 10ð Þþ kH D X1ð ÞD 10ð Þð Þð Þ
, a¼ ln D 10ð Þð Þ ln D 10ð Þþ kH D X1ð ÞD 10ð Þð Þð Þ
ln Lð Þ lnðCÞ :
Estimation of a in TTO2 in case of loss aversion:
Dð10Þ  Q C þ kMðS CÞ½ a
¼ Dð10Þ þ kH DðX2Þ  Dð10Þð Þ½   Q Ca
, C
C þ kM S Cð Þ
 a
¼ D 10ð Þ
D 10ð Þ þ kH D X2ð Þ  D 10ð Þð Þ
, a ln Cð Þ  ln C þ kM S Cð Þð Þð Þ
¼ ln D 10ð Þð Þ  ln D 10ð Þ þ kH D X2ð Þ  D 10ð Þð Þð Þ , a
¼ ln D 10ð Þð Þ  ln D 10ð Þ þ kH D X2ð Þ  D 10ð Þð Þð Þ
ln Cð Þ  ln C þ kM S Cð Þð Þ :
Estimation of a in QTO in case of loss aversion
D 10ð Þ  1 Ca ¼ D 10ð Þ  1 1þ kQ X3  1ð Þ½ 
 La L
C
 a
¼ 1þ kQ X3  1ð Þ1, a
¼  ln 1þ kQ X3  1ð Þð Þ
ln Lð Þ  ln Cð Þ :
Appendix C: analysis using disaggregated
approach
See Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 5 Overview
WTP1
(L–C)
WTP2
(C–S)
WTP3
(L–C QoL)
A Non-tradersa 247
(44.9%)
180
(32.7%)
148 (26.9%)
B Over-traders; negative WTP 77 (14%) 111
(20.2%)
0 (add); 151
(27.5%, mul)
C Over-traders; trading off all
years/qualitya
1 (0.2%) 8 (1.5%) 2 (0.4%)
D Zero WTP 12 (2.2%) 59
(10.7%)
0
E S = 0a 0 2 (0.4%) 0
F Net sample size disaggregated
approach (550-A-C-E)
302
(54.9%)
360
(65.5%)
400 (72.7%)
Add additive model, mul multiplicative model
a Excluded from analysis
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Appendix D: descriptive statistics
See Tables 7 and 8.
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